一、主题：Sovereign Default and Labor Market Dynamics
二、主讲人：刘思鸣博士，上海财经大学云顶集团yd1233助理教授。刘思鸣博士分别于美国印第安纳大学布卢明顿分校和复旦大学取得经济学博士和数学学士学位。主要研究领域为开放宏观、国际金融、宏观金融以及财政政策。他的部分工作论文正处于Journal of International Economics和Review of Economic Dynamic等国际一流经济学期刊的返修阶段。
Abstract: This paper investigates the interaction between labor market dynamics and sovereign debt risk. Countercyclical default risk and the limited ability to borrow during recessions renders the government a procyclical fiscal policy. The anticipation of higher tax rates in downturns discourages agents' participation in the labor market and creates prolonged unemployment. The slack labor market, in turn, aggravates the default risk and strengthens the fiscal procyclicality. Moreover, under the discretionary policy, a government does not internalize the dynamic-scratching effect of raising tax rates on employment, so it suffers a low level of job creation and high default incentives. In this environment, imposing commitment measures on tax rates such as fiscal covenant can stimulate job creation, improve debt sustainability, and lead to a significant welfare gain.